Abstract
Introduction
dates for moral foundations, are conveniently collected at a single website, 
60
The Gallup polls indicate that many individuals change their positions 61 on moral issues over time. Although it is difficult to know the cause of an 62 individual changing position, exposure to arguments is an obvious candidate (Chong, 1996; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Keasey, 1973; Lindström, 1995, 64 1997). The new perspective we offer is that reliance on moral foundations 65 might influence the individual's receptiveness to various arguments that bears 66 on an issue -thereby explaining why an individual who is exposed to an 67 argument on a moral issue may sometimes change position, sometimes not. In the coming sections we explore the idea sketched above. First we de- proposed in a seminal paper by Haidt and Graham (2007 For instance, a classic study of Eiser and White (1974) etc.). The group-exposure bias for a given set of values will be defined as the 250 ratio between two probabilities as follows:
Prob(a Lib is exposed to a Con's argument) Prob(a Lib is exposed to a Lib's argument) and, analogously,
252
G c = Prob(a Con is exposed to a Lib's argument) Prob(a Con is exposed to a Con's argument) .
Note that these probability ratios incorporate the influence of all factors on 253 exposure. Thus, the group-exposure bias will reflect the total influence of all exposure probabilities assumed to be non-zero and a Lib assumed to be 259 at least as likely to be exposed to a Lib argument than to a Con argument, 260 etc., the group-exposure bias parameters are assumed to satisfy 0 < G l ≤ 1 261 and 0 < G c ≤ 1.
262
Our assumption is that the source of bias in exposure is group member-263 ship, not position. In other words, we assume the conditional probability 264 of being exposed to an argument for, given that the individual making the 265 argument is a Con, to be just the current proportion of for within the Con 274 P l = Prob(a Lib who is for is swayed when exposed to an arg. against) Prob(a Lib who is against is swayed when exposed to an arg. for) and, analogously,
275
P c = Prob(a Con who is against is swayed when exposed to an arg. for) Prob(a Con who is for is swayed when exposed to an arg. against) .
Assuming all swaying probabilities to be non-zero and a Lib more likely to 276 be swayed to for than against, etc., the position-change bias parameters 277 must satisfy 0 < P l ≤ 1 and 0 < P c ≤ 1.
278
The third parameter is the influentiability coefficient. This is a measure Lib who is for. This event happens with rate (1 − q l )q l I l .
295
• A Lib who is currently against may be swayed from exposure to a
296
Con who is for. Because of group-exposure bias, this happens only 297 with a rate of (1 − q l )q c G l I l .
298
• A Lib who is currently for may be swayed from exposure to a Lib who 299 is against. Because of position-change bias, this happens only with a rate of q l (1 − q l )P l I l .
301
• A Lib who is currently for may be swayed from exposure to a Con 302 who is against. Because of combination of group-exposure bias and 303 position-change bias, this happens only with rate q l (1 − q c )G l P l I l .
304
Under the assumption that the population is infinite there will be no stochas-305 tic effects and we can just sum the above rates of change, with the appropriate 306 signs, to obtain the following formula for change over a small time step ∆t:
In this equation, note how the three parameters occur in the right-hand side Libs is unaffected. As we shall see in the Appendix, it is therefore difficult,
317
and often impossible, for a change in the latter bias to compensate for a 318 change in the former bias.
319
By analyzing the analogous four events for swaying of Cons we obtain a 320 similar equation for the dynamics of q c :
Note that the parameters occur in this equation in the same manner as in 
Results

328
A mathematical analysis of this dynamical system is given in the Ap- illustrates that the same equilibrium is approached, only at a slower speed,
360
if an influentiability coefficient is set at a lower value (Simulation C).
361
Now consider the effect of group-exposure bias. the for position due to conservative group-exposure bias.
368
Next we turn to position-change bias, the key concept of this paper. Fig-369 ure 4 compares the reference case with Simulation E, in which the liberal who strongly endorse only one kind of moral foundations.
Discussion of the model assumptions
457
We also discussed the empirical finding that conservatives tend to give gate how sensitive this conclusion are to the presence of group-exposure bias.
471
The results can be summarized as a third prediction.
472
Prediction 3: Unless conservative group-exposure bias is much stronger Vliert (2011)). In the same vein as these findings, our theoretical argument 500 yields a prediction about societal differences.
501
Prediction 4: Societal trends towards more liberal opinons on moral 502 issues should be found mainly in societies with media pluralism and free
503
speech.
504
This prediction should be of broad interest to psychologists, sociologists 505 and political scientists. 
Conclusion
507
Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling wrote a book based on the principle that 508 macrobehavior can be derived from micromotives (Schelling, 2006 there is zero change, that is, when the formulas in (1) and (2) equal zero.
544
The equilibrium equations can be written
Note that the equilibrium equations do not depend on the influentiability that is, any proportion of for is an equilibrium as long as it is the same in 567 both groups. All remaining ("nontrivial") mixed equilibria must satisfy both 568 P l < 1 and P c < 1.
569
Appendix A.4. Nontrivial mixed equilibria
570
In order to look for parameters allowing non-trivial mixed equilibria, we 571 will henceforth assume that 0 < q l , q c , P l , P c < 1. If we divide the equilibrium 
Note that the constant term is negative, so there will be only one positive 577 solution. Letting
the non-trivial mixed equilibrium solution to (A.5) can be expressed as
In equations (A.3) and (A.4) the roles of β and γ are symmetric with 580 respect to swapping Lib and Con(whereas R is invariant under this swap).
581
Hence, by swapping Lib and Con in (A.6) we obtain the non-trivial mixed 582 equilibrium value for β:
Recall the identities q l = (1 − β)/(1 − γβ) and q c = γq l . The values of q l
584
and q c in a non-trivial mixed equilibrium can therefore be expressed as lie between 0 and 1, the inequalityγ < 1 straightforwardly simplifies to
Symmetrically,β < 1 implies that has an eigenvalue with absolute value greater than one. It is straightforward 607 to calculate the Jacobian, evaluate it at either of the two pure equilibria,
608
and verify that the inequalities (A.9) and (A.10), respectively, imply that 609 the largest eigenvalue is greater than 1. We omit the details. the position-change bias P l , whereas the value of G l has much less influence.
619
In other words, a change in P l can only be compensated for (if at all) by of values of the parameters P l and G l for which (q l +q c )/2 > 1/2 (i.e., the majority is for in the mixed equilibrium) or (q l +q c )/2 < 1/2 (i.e., the majority is against in th emixed equilibrium).
